Venicassa v. Consol Coal Co by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-27-1998 
Venicassa v. Consol Coal Co 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"Venicassa v. Consol Coal Co" (1998). 1998 Decisions. 36. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/36 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed February 27, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 96-3736 
 
ARMANDO VENICASSA, 
 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY 
 
and 
 
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
 
       Respondents 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits 
Review Board, United States Department of Labor 
BRB No. 95-1760 
 
Argued September 25, 1997 
 
Before: COWEN, ROTH and LEWIS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed February 27, 1998) 
 
       Robert L. Johnson, Esquire (Argued) 
       Paul A. Tershel, Esquire 
       Tershel & Associates 
       55 South Main Street 
       Washington, PA 15301 
 
        Attorneys for Armando Venicassa 
 
 
  
       J. Davitt McAteer, 
       Acting Solicitor of Labor 
       Donald S. Shire, 
       Associate Solicitor 
       Christian P. Barber, Esquire 
       Jeffrey S. Goldberg, Esquire (Argued) 
       United States Department of Labor 
       200 Constitution Avenue, N.W. 
       Suite N-2605 
       Washington, D.C. 20210 
 
        Attorneys for Director, Office of 
        Workers' Compensation Programs, 
        United States Department of Labor 
 
       William S. Mattingly, Esquire 
        (Argued) 
       Jackson & Kelly 
       600 Hampton Center, Suite B 
       P.O. Box 619 
       Morgantown, WV 26507 
 
        Attorney for Consolidated Coal 
        Company 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Armando Venicassa has filed a Petition for Review from 
the decision of the Benefits Review Board ("Board"), 
affirming the denial by the Administrative Law Judge 
("ALJ") of Venicassa's claim for black lung benefits under 
the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. S 901, et. seq. (the 
"Act"). In an earlier hearing, the ALJ had dismissed United 
States Steel Corporation, the responsible coal mine 
operator, designated by the Office of Worker's 
Compensation Programs ("OWCP"), and had awarded 
benefits to Venicassa, to be paid by the Black Lung 
Disability Trust Fund ("Trust Fund"). The Director of the 
OWCP appealed this decision to the Board. The Board then 
remanded Venicassa's claim to the OWCP to permit the 
OWCP to identify a second responsible operator to pay 
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benefits. We must decide whether, after the award on the 
merits to Venicassa, the Board could vacate that award so 
that the ALJ might designate a second responsible operator 
and begin the process all over again. 
 
For the reasons we discuss below, we conclude that the 
Board erred when it remanded this case for designation of 
a second responsible operator. We will, therefore, grant the 
petition for review, vacate the decision of the Board, and 
remand this case to the Board to reinstate the ALJ's ruling, 
granting Venicassa's claim for benefits and ordering the 
Trust Fund to pay them.1 
 
We have appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act, 33 U.S.C. S 902, made applicable to Black Lung 
Benefits cases by 30 U.S.C. S 932(a). The decision of the 
Benefits Review Board is a final order under Section 21(c) 
of the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act, 33 U.S.C. S 921(c) as incorporated by section 422(a) of 
the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. S 932(a). 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
This case comes to us with a lengthy procedural history, 
due in large part to the long delay by the OWCP in 
processing Venicassa's claim and to the acknowledged error 
by the OWCP in designating the responsible coal mine  
operator.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We are also asked to decide whether the ALJ's determination at a 
second hearing, denying benefits, was supported by substantial 
evidence. Venicassa submits that the denial of benefits by the ALJ on 
remand was irrational because the ALJ relied on the same medical 
evidence that he had relied on to make the initial award of benefits. 
Because of our decision on the second designation issue, we do not need 
to reach this question. 
 
2. Unfortunately, the OWCP's failure to designate the proper responsible 
operator at the outset has exacerbated a problem all too familiar to us. 
We have confronted a disturbing record of delay in processing claims for 
black lung benefits in prior cases. See Kowalchick v. Director, OWCP, 893 
F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1990) (Benefits awarded 17 years after the initial claim 
was filed); Lango v. Director, OWCP, 104 F.3d 573 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting 
long delay in processing claim for benefits). 
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The petitioner in this case, Armando Venicassa, worked 
in and around coal mining operations for 43 years before 
he retired in 1985. In 1986, he filed a claim with the OWCP 
for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. Under the 
Act, benefits are awardable to persons who are totally 
disabled due to pneumoconiosis, a disease known as "black 
lung." The OWCP processed Venicassa's claim for benefits 
with the information he supplied. Venicassa indicated 
clearly on his claim form that his most recent employer was 
Consolidation Coal Company, for whom he worked from 
January 1984 until his retirement in August 1985. 
However, despite being supplied with accurate information, 
the OWCP erroneously designated United States Steel 
Corporation ("U.S. Steel") as the responsible operator.3 
 
Venicassa's claim was then referred to the Department of 
Labor's Office of Administrative Law Judges for a formal 
hearing. In February 1987, the Director of the OWCP 
moved to remand the case for identification of another 
responsible operator. This motion to remand came 13 
months after Venicassa had provided the OWCP with the 
information to identify the proper responsible operator. In 
August 1988, prior to the formal hearing on Venicassa's 
claim, the ALJ denied the motion to remand.4 Citing the 
Benefits Review Board decision in Crabtree v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp.,7 BLR 1-354 (1984), the ALJ held that due 
process concerns dictated that the hearing go forward and 
that, if U.S. Steel was not the responsible operator, it would 
be dismissed and the Director of the OWCP substituted to 
defend the claim. At the hearing, Venicassa testified that 
U.S. Steel had been improperly designated as the 
responsible operator. The ALJ then dismissed U.S. Steel 
and substituted the Director. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Venicassa indicated on his claim form that he was employed by U.S. 
Steel from 1942 until January 1984. The regulations define "responsible 
operator" as "the operator or other employer with which the miner had 
the most recent periods of cumulative employment of not less than one 
(1) year..." 20 C.F.R. S 725.493 (a)(1). 
 
4. The record reflects that the ALJ, who ruled on the remand motion in 
August 1988, did not receive the case until May or June of that year 
even though the case was referred to the Office of Administrative Law 
Judges in September of the previous year. Appendix 56-57. 
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To succeed on a claim for black lung benefits, a claimant 
must establish that he suffers from pneumoconiosis and, 
as a result, is totally disabled. In addition, the claimant 
must establish that the pneumoconiosis is the result of coal 
mining. Under the Act, pneumoconiosis may be established 
by x-ray evidence or by a finding of a physician that the 
miner suffers from the disease. 30 U.S.C. S 902(f)(1) (1986); 
20 C.F.R. S 718.202. 
 
At the hearing, the ALJ concluded that Venicassa's chest 
x-rays did not establish pneumoconiosis. However, the ALJ 
also heard five medical experts, four of whom diagnosed 
some form of lung disease related to coal dust exposure. 
The one physician, who did not find lung disease related to 
coal exposure, did so without providing his reasoning. The 
ALJ, therefore, ascribed little weight to that opinion. The 
ALJ concluded that the weight of medical opinion 
established the finding of pneumoconiosis. Since Venicassa 
had at least 10 years of coal mining employment, the ALJ 
found that Venicassa was entitled to the statutory 
presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose as a result of 
coal mine employment. 30 U.S.C. S 921(c) (1986). The ALJ 
credited Venicassa with 43 years of coal mine employment 
and found evidence sufficient to establish the existence of 
pneumoconiosis due to that employment. As a result, on 
June 23, 1989, the ALJ awarded benefits to Venicassa. 
 
The Director appealed this decision to the Benefits 
Review Board. In its review of the ALJ's decision, the Board 
did not address the merits of the entitlement to benefits. 
Instead, it vacated the award and remanded the case to the 
deputy commissioner for determination of another 
responsible operator. The Board found it significant that 
the Director had filed the Motion to Remand before a formal 
hearing had been held. For this reason, the Board held that 
the due process concerns of relitigating the case were less 
compelling than those facing the Crabtree Court. 
 
On remand, the OWCP designated Consolidation Coal as 
the responsible operator. Venicassa's benefits were then 
stopped. In December 1994, a second hearing on 
Venicassa's eligibility for benefits was held before the same 
ALJ. Consolidation Coal submitted evidence in addition to 
that presented at the first hearing. Venicassa submitted 
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only the record of the medical evidence from thefirst 
hearing. In addition, Venicassa testified about the 
deterioration of his health during the more than five years 
since the initial award of benefits. The physicians, who had 
presented medical testimony at the first hearing regarding 
Venicassa's respiratory problems, did not testify in person 
at the second hearing. 
 
At the conclusion of the second hearing, the ALJ denied 
Venicassa's claim for benefits. Venicassa appealed to the 
Benefits Review Board on June 23, 1995. On October 22, 
1996, the Board issued a final decision, affirming the 
decision of the ALJ. Venicassa then timely filed his petition 
for review with this Court. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
We review decisions of the Benefits Review Board and of 
the ALJ for errors of law. Lango v. Director, OWCP, 104 F.3d 
573, 575 (3d Cir. 1997); Kowalchick v. Director, OWCP, 893 
F.2d 615, 619 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
The petitioner contends that the Board's reversal of the 
award of benefits and its decision to remand this case for 
the designation of a second responsible operator violated 
due process and subjected him to substantial prejudice. He 
argues that to make him relitigate a claim, on which he has 
already won an award of benefits on the merits, violates 
due process. He further contends that, under the rationale 
of the Benefits Review Board in Crabtree, the efficient 
administration of the Black Lung Benefits Act dictates that 
the case should not have been remanded and that the 
Trust Fund should be reinstated as payor. 
 
The Director argues that, although a mistake occurred in 
the designation of U.S. Steel as the responsible operator at 
the outset, the Director attempted to correct the mistake 
with the motion to remand for designation of another 
responsible operator. The Director further contends that the 
ALJ's denial of that motion was in error and that the Trust 
Fund is not the appropriate payor because ultimately 
Consolidation Coal was identified as the responsible 
operator. 
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We begin our review with an examination of the 
regulations, under the Black Lung Benefits Act, which 
govern the designation of a responsible operator. These 
regulations provide: 
 
       At any time during the processing of a claim under this 
       part, after sufficient evidence has been made available 
       to the deputy commissioner, the deputy commissioner 
       may identify a coal mine operator...which may be liable 
       for the payment of the claim .... Such identification 
       shall be made as soon after the filing of the claim as 
       the evidence obtained permits .... 
 
20 C.F.R. S 725.412(a). The responsible operator is defined 
as "the operator or other employer with which the 
individual had the most recent periods of cumulative 
employment of not less than one (1) year." 20 C.F.R. 
S 725.493(a)(1).  
 
It is uncontested that, as of January 1986 when 
Venicassa first filed his claim, the OWCP had all the 
evidence necessary to designate the proper responsible 
operator. However, the Director argues that, under the Act 
and the applicable regulations, a coal mine operator may be 
designated as responsible operator for the purposes of 
defending a claim for Black Lung Benefits "at any time" 
during the processing of the claim. The Director claims, 
therefore, that the ALJ improperly refused to remand the 
case for the designation of a second responsible operator. 
 
The regulations also state, however, that the 
identification of the responsible operator shall be made "as 
soon after the filing of the claim as the evidence obtained 
permits." For this reason, Venicassa argues that, since from 
the outset the Director had enough information to name the 
proper responsible operator, Venicassa should not be 
penalized for the Director's failure to do so. Venicassa 
contends that, because the OWCP did not make a prompt 
resolution of the responsible operator issue, the ALJ's 
decision to go forward with the hearing on the merits was 
appropriate; to proceed otherwise would have subjected 
Venicassa to further substantial delay in the processing of 
his claim. 
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When the ALJ considered the Director's motion to 
remand the case for designation of another responsible 
operator, he relied on the decision of the Benefits Review 
Board in Crabtree. In Crabtree, the Board dismissed 
Bethlehem Steel as the responsible operator. Instead, 
however, of remanding the case for identification of another 
responsible operator, the Board held that the Trust Fund 
would be liable for benefits because the delay involved in 
relitigating the claim would offend due process. In Crabtree, 
the Board concluded that "the Department of Labor is not 
entitled to a second opportunity to identify another putative 
responsible operator." Id. at 1-356-357. 
 
        Remand for reconsideration of the operator issue 
       would be tantamount to relitigating the claim. If the 
       Department identifies another responsible operator, 
       then that operator is entitled to contest the claim, 
       develop its own evidence, request a hearing, etc., until 
       it has exhausted the full gamut of available procedures 
       for adjudicating entitlement. The fact that claimant has 
       established entitlement against employer does not bind 
       any other operator(s) who were not a party to the 
       proceedings. This piecemeal approach encourages two 
       undesirable results. First, a claimant who has 
       established entitlement in the first round of 
       proceedings may lose his award in a later round 
       against another operator. A first finding of entitlement, 
       even though fully developed and litigated, can be 
       defeated in subsequent proceedings by a different 
       operator, and not always on the merits. Second, 
       piecemeal litigation obviously is not compatible with 
       the efficient administration of the Act and expeditious 
       processing of claims. 
 
        In view of the aforementioned considerations, the 
       Department must resolve the operator issue in a 
       preliminary proceeding, see 20 C.F.R. S725.412(d), 
       and/or proceed against all putative responsible 
       operators at every stage of the claims adjudication. 
       Even a separate preliminary proceeding on the operator 
       issue alone is more desirable than fully litigating the 
       claim against each operator individually. ... The Trust 
       Fund therefore must assume liability in the absence of 
       any other potentially liable operator. 
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Id. at 1-357. 
 
The Director contends, however, that Crabtree should not 
have prevented the OWCP from identifying Consolidation 
Coal as the responsible operator even after the ALJ had 
awarded benefits payable by the Trust Fund. The Director 
urges that the critical distinction between Venicassa's case 
and the Crabtree decision is that here a motion to remand 
was filed before the hearing on the merits. Therefore, 
Crabtree does not apply. The Director contends that 
remand, at the time that the motion was filed, would have 
been appropriate under Crabtree because remand would 
have been prior to litigation of the claim; Crabtree held only 
that the Director could not wait until after the ALJ had 
awarded benefits against the Trust Fund before seeking to 
identify a second responsible operator. Because the motion 
to remand was filed 18 months before the hearing on the 
merits and was denied prior to the hearing, the Director 
claims he did not have an opportunity to ascertain the 
correct responsible operator.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In making this argument, the Director also relies on Director, OWCP v. 
Trace Fork Coal Company, 67 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 1995). However, Trace 
Fork does not in fact support the Director's position. In Trace Fork, the 
ALJ dismissed the coal company as responsible operator, refusing to 
remand the case for the designation of another responsible operator, and 
then named the Trust Fund as payor. The ALJ awarded benefits and the 
Director appealed the ALJ's finding that the Trust Fund was liable. The 
Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ's ruling. The Fourth Circuit held 
that dismissal of Trace Fork as responsible operator was proper and 
affirmed the refusal to remand for the naming of another responsible 
operator. The Board and the Fourth Circuit based their decisions on 
Crabtree and on the holding in that case that the Director must resolve 
the responsible operator issue in a preliminary proceeding or else 
proceed against all potential operators at each stage of the adjudication 
in order to avoid piecemeal litigation and due process concerns. The 
Trace Fork court found that to remand the case would allow a second 
operator to challenge the claimant's entitlement to benefits. The court 
concluded, "We are unwilling to potentially upset the finding that 
[claimant] is entitled to benefits, a matter already fully litigated on 
the 
merits. The Director had full opportunity, and even a motion, to 
ascertain the responsible operator as a preliminary matter, but simply 
refused." Trace Fork, 67 F.3d at 508. 
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In resolving the motion to remand in the instant case, the 
ALJ concluded that the "Director blew it" in failing to name 
the proper responsible operator. (Appendix 56). For this 
reason, the ALJ dismissed U.S. Steel and substituted the 
Trust Fund as the responsible party. The ALJ's decision 
places the incentives in the proper place -- the Director 
should have gotten it right the first time. That would not 
have been an onerous task because, from the outset, the 
OWCP had in its possession all the information necessary 
to name the proper responsible operator. 
 
The Director, however, argues that the plain language of 
the regulations allows for the designation of a responsible 
operator "at any time" during the processing of the claim. 
Therefore the OWCP should be allowed to rectify its 
mistake. The Director relies on the Sixth Circuit's decision 
in Director, O.W.C.P. v. Oglebay Norton Company, 877 F.2d 
1300 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 
Although we have not decided a case involving the failure 
of the OWCP to correctly name the responsible operator in 
the first instance, Oglebay addresses such a situation in a 
black lung, widow's benefits case. In Oglebay, the court 
considered the identification of a responsible operator 
nearly ten years after the claim was filed. The Director 
appealed a decision of the Benefits Review Board which had 
dismissed the company as responsible operator. The Sixth 
Circuit held that the identification of the company as 
"responsible operator" nearly ten years after the claim was 
filed was valid and that the transfer of liability to the Fund 
was improper. In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit 
interpreted the regulation, governing the identification of 
the responsible operator (20 C.F.R. S 725.412(a)). The Court 
noted that the regulation permits identification of the 
responsible operator at any time during the processing of 
the claim. In addition, the Sixth Circuit found the transfer 
of liability to the Trust Fund to be improper when there is 
an affirmative identification of a responsible operator. 
Oglebay, 877 F.2d at 1304. The court reasoned that neither 
the applicable statutes nor regulations indicated that 
identification of the responsible operator should be 
disregarded merely because it was inefficiently reached; the 
operator would not be substantially prejudiced in defending 
the matter on its merits. 
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The Director asks us to disregard Crabtree and follow the 
Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Oglebay. We are not, however, 
bound by Oglebay. Moreover, the instant case is easily 
distinguishable from Oglebay. First, Oglebay involved a 
dispute between the OWCP and the responsible operator. 
The case before us involves a dispute between the claimant, 
the Director, and the putative responsible operator. Second, 
in Oglebay the ALJ decided to remand the case for 
determination of another responsible operator prior to 
holding a hearing on the merits. In the instant case, the 
decision to remand was made after a formal hearing on the 
merits and after the ALJ had awarded benefits. In other 
words, the Crabtree concerns about due process and 
piecemeal litigation -- relied on by the ALJ in denying the 
motion to remand -- are greater in the instant case than 
were those faced by the court in Oglebay. 
 
Moreover, there is another important distinction between 
this case and Oglebay. The Oglebay court reasoned that 
inefficient identification of the responsible operator does not 
invalidate that identification. In our case, however, the 
Director had before it all the relevant information necessary 
to designate the proper responsible operator -- but failed to 
do so. The OWCP's failure here is more than mere 
inefficiency. Indeed, this failure penalized Venicassa, who 
had already litigated the case on the merits and won. It also 
penalized Consolidation Coal, which had to litigate a 10 
year old claim. 
 
The Director contends, however, that, because the motion 
to remand was made prior to litigation of the claim on the 
merits, remand and designation of a responsible operator 
were appropriate and did not raise due process concerns. 
Consolidation Coal argues, on the other hand, that the 
critical issue here is not the timing of the motion to remand 
but the timing of the identification of the responsible 
operator. To resolve this dispute, we must go back to the 
language of the regulation. 
 
The regulation allows for the designation of a responsible 
operator "at any time." Thus, the Director asserts that, 
upon receiving the motion to remand, the ALJ should have 
allowed the designation of a second responsible operator. 
The Director argues that, while the OWCP clearly erred in 
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failing to identify Consolidation Coal as the responsible 
operator at the outset, the ALJ erred in denying the motion 
to remand the case in order to correct the problem. The 
Director contends that the Act gives the OWCP sole 
responsibility for identifying the responsible operator who 
may be liable for payment of benefits. 20 C.F.R. 
SS 725.410(b), 725.412. The Director relies on the 
regulatory language which provides for designation of a 
responsible operator "at any time during the processing of 
a claim" and contends that a claim is still being "processed" 
even after it is referred to the ALJ for a hearing. 
 
While the regulation clearly states that the designation of 
the responsible operator may be made "at any time," the 
language of the regulation triggers the process by providing 
that the designation be made "after sufficient evidence has 
been made available to the deputy commissioner." The 
regulation then further limits the process by providing that 
the designation "shall be made as soon after thefiling of 
the claim as evidence obtained permits." 20 C.F.R. 
S 725.412(a). The focus of the regulation is clearly on the 
swift and accurate designation of the responsible operator 
so that the claim may be resolved through the presentation 
of evidence to the fact finder by the appropriate parties. 
 
Because the OWCP did not make a timely designation of 
the proper responsible operator, nor did it even make a 
timely attempt to correct its misdesignation or to add 
Consolidation Coal as a potential responsible operator, we 
conclude that the ALJ at the first hearing correctly 
designated the Trust Fund as the defending party. 6 
 
Moreover, this result is consistent with the purpose 
behind the establishment of the Trust Fund. The Trust 
Fund was established by the Black Lung Benefits Revenue 
Act of 1977 "to provide a more effective means of 
transferring the responsibility for the payment of benefits 
from the Federal government to the coal industry ...." 20 
C.F.R. S 725.490(a). The Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act 
of 1977, (Pub. Law 95-227) (92 Stat. 11) (1978 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Contrary to the approach of the petitioner, and to the views expressed 
in the dissent, we do not ground our decision on due process 
considerations. 
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U.S.C.C.A.N.) (codified at 30 U.S.C. S 934a). The fund is 
financed by the coal industry through an excise tax on the 
sale of coal. 26 U.S.C. S 9501. 
 
The Director argues that the Trust Fund should not be 
liable in this instance because the Trust Fund was created 
to assume liability for benefits in the event that no 
responsible operator could be found. The statute provides 
that the Trust Fund is available for the payment of benefits 
in any case in which the Secretary determines that "there 
is no operator who is required to secure the payment of 
such benefits." 26 U.S.C. S 9501(d)(B).7 
 
In order to support its argument that the Trust Fund 
should be liable only in the absence of an identifiable 
responsible operator, the Director emphasizes a portion of 
the Act's legislative history which states that Congress 
intended to ensure that individual coal operators, rather 
than the Trust Fund, would be liable for claims.8 The Sixth 
Circuit relied on these statements in holding that, where a 
responsible operator has been identified, the transfer of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The provision reads that the Trust Fund shall be liable for the 
payment of benefits in any case in which the Secretary determines that: 
 
       (a) the operator liable for the payment of such benefits -- 
 
       (i) has not commenced payment of such benefits within 30 days 
       after the date of an initial determination of eligibility by the 
       Secretary, or 
 
       (ii) has not made a payment within 30 days after the payment is 
       due, 
 
       (b) there is no operator who is required to secure payment of such 
       benefits, ... 
 
26 U.S.C. S 9501(d) (emphasis added). 
 
8. "It is further the intention of this section, with respect to claims 
related to which the miner worked on or after January 1, 1970, to 
ensure that individual coal operators rather than the trust fund bear the 
liability for claims arising out of such operator's mines, to the maximum 
extent feasible." S. Rep. 209, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977), reprinted 
in 
House Comm. On Educ. And Labor, 96th Cong., Black Lung Benefits 
Reform Act and Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, 612 (Comm. 
Print 1979). See also Old Ben Coal Co. v. Luker, 826 F.2d 688, 693 (7th 
Cir. 1987). 
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liability to the Trust Fund is improper. Oglebay, 877 F.2d 
at 1304. 
 
However, investigation into the legislative history 
indicates that Congress did not contemplate the situation 
before us. Indeed, the Trust Fund's architects were 
motivated by a desire to curb the ability of coal mine 
operators to transfer assets in order to sidestep liability as 
responsible operators. 
 
At the time of the Trust Fund's creation, its drafters were 
cognizant of the structural changes in the coal industry 
which resulted in the consolidation of numerous coal 
companies and the disappearance of others. They were 
particularly conscious of the impact of these changes on 
future claimants and of their effect on the responsibility of 
successor and former operators.9 
 
       During the last two decades, the coal industry has 
       undergone major structural changes. Of the 50 largest 
       coal companies, 29 have become captive of other 
       industries ...In most instances, these acquisitions 
       transferred intact the ownership of the mines and 
       operations of existing coal producers to the larger and 
       more diversified parent corporations. ... It was 
       originally the intent of Congress that such entities 
       should bear the liability for black lung diseases arising 
       out of employment in their mines ... . 
 
S. Rep. 209, at 9. 
 
Thus, while the Act evidences an intent that individual 
coal mine operators, rather than the Trust Fund, assume 
liability for the payment of black lung benefits, the rationale 
behind this determination is the protection of claimants 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. "When the black lung benefits provisions of the Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 1969 were first enacted, it was the expectation 
of Congress that after the Federally financed portion of the program 
terminated, individual coal mine operators would assume the liability for 
benefits either under an approved state workers' compensation program 
or under Part C of the Federal Act. In order to facilitate assessment of 
liability against coal mine operators, Section 422(I) prohibited the 
avoidance of such liability by coal mine operators through the 
mechanism of a post enactment transfer of assets...." S. Rep. 209 at 8. 
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from the denial of benefits due to the disappearance of any 
responsible operator. Here, because of the failure of the 
OWCP to identify the responsible operator "as soon after 
the filing of the claim as the evidence obtained permits," it 
is the claimant who will suffer unless the Trust Fund 
assumes responsibility for payment of the benefits. This 
result will protect the claimant, which is the purpose of the 
Act. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Black Lung Benefits Act was enacted in order to 
ensure benefits for coal miners who have been totally 
disabled due to black lung disease as a result of their work 
in coal mines. Despite possessing accurate information 
regarding Venicassa's employment history, the Office of 
Worker's Compensation Programs failed to designate the 
proper responsible operator to defend the claim. As a result 
of this failure, the Benefits Review Board ruled that 
Venicassa had to relitigate his claim. We conclude, 
however, that the OWCP's failure to make a timely 
designation of the proper responsible operator should not 
have jeopardized the award of benefits which had been 
made to Venicassa. We will, therefore, grant the petition for 
review, vacate the decision of the Benefit's Review Board, 
and remand this case for reinstatement of the June 23, 
1989, order and award of the Administrative Law Judge. 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
Today the majority holds that a district director is not 
authorized, under any circumstances, to correct a mistaken 
responsible operator identification. Because this holding is 
contrary to, inter alia, the Director's reasonable 
interpretation of 20 C.F.R. S 725.412(a) and (c), 
congressional intent, and the Sixth Circuit's decisions in 
Caudill Construction Co. v. Abner, 878 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 
1989) and Director, OWCP v. Oglebay Norton Co., 877 F.2d 
1300 (6th Cir. 1989), I must respectfully dissent. 
 
I. 
 
The standards governing our review of an agency's 
interpretation of its own regulations are well known and not 
in dispute. We owe "substantial deference" to the agency's 
interpretation, which has " `controlling weight unless it is 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' " 
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 
S. Ct. 2381, 2386 (1994) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock 
& Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S. Ct. 1215, 1217 
(1945)); see also Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 453 (3d Cir. 
1994). Absent constitutional or statutory violations, the 
only circumstance in which we do not defer is where "an 
`alternative reading is compelled by the regulations's plain 
language or by other indications of the [agency's] intent at 
the time of the regulation's promulgation.' " Thomas 
Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512, 114 S. Ct. at 2386-87 
(quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430, 108 
S. Ct. 1306, 1314 (1988)). "In addition, we give judicial 
deference to the Director, as policymaker, rather than to 
the Board, which is purely an adjudicator." Director, OWCP 
v. Eastern Coal Corp., 54 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(citations omitted). I believe that the majority fails to adhere 
to these fundamental principles. Indeed, the most striking 
aspect of the majority's opinion is its complete failure even 
to mention our duty, under most circumstances, to defer to 
an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. 
 
II. 
 
Section 725.412 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
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        (a) At any time during the processing of a claim 
       under this part, after sufficient evidence has been 
       made available to the [district director], the[district 
       director] may identify a coal miner [sic] operator (see 
       S 725.491) which may be liable for payment of the 
       claim. . . . Such identification shall be made as soon 
       after the filing of the claim as the evidence obtained 
       permits. . . . 
 
        . . . . 
 
        (c) If within one year after the final adjudication of a 
       claim, the adjudication officer determines that an 
       operator which may be liable for the payment of 
       benefits has not been notified under this section, such 
       adjudication officer shall give notice of possible liability 
       and an opportunity to respond to such operator. The 
       adjudication officer shall then take such further action 
       on the claim as may be appropriate. 
 
20 C.F.R. S 725.412(a), (c). 
 
A. The Director's Interpretation 
 
According to the Director, section 725.412 provides that: 
(1) a district director1 is authorized to correct mistaken 
responsible operator identifications; (2) such corrections 
may occur "at any time" during the processing of a claim, 
and up to one year after final adjudication; and (3) a 
district director has no duty--beyond the "at any time" 
limitation above--to identify a responsible operator within a 
reasonable time after the information necessary to make an 
identification becomes available to him. Each of these 
contentions will be addressed in turn. 
 
       1. Ability to Make Corrections 
 
The Director asserts that section 725.412 "clearly 
authorizes the correction of a mistaken responsible 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. A district director is a person authorized to develop and adjudicate 
claims for black lung benefits. For administrative purposes only, 
regulations substitute the term district director for the term deputy 
commissioner, which is found in the Longshore Act. See 20 C.F.R. 
S 725.101(a)(11). 
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operator identification . . . ." Respondent's Br. at 12. I 
agree. There is simply nothing in the regulation that is 
inconsistent with this interpretation. Nor does this 
interpretation conflict with any statutory or constitutional 
provisions. On the contrary, the Director's view effectuates 
clear congressional intent to limit Trust Fund liability to 
those instances in which no responsible operator can be 
identified. See 26 U.S.C. S 9501(d). Moreover, it is 
supported by two persuasive Sixth Circuit decisions. See 
Oglebay, 877 F.2d at 1305 (corrections permitted pursuant 
to section 725.412(a)); Caudill Const., 878 F.2d at 181 
(corrections permitted pursuant to section 725.412(c)). 
Consequently, we must defer to the Director's reasonable 
interpretation. 
 
       2. Timing of Corrections 
 
The Director next contends that section 725.412(a) and 
(c) authorize the district director or ALJ to correct a 
mistaken responsible operator identification "at any time" 
during the processing of a claim, and up to one year after 
a final adjudication. The Director also contends that the 
ability to make such corrections is not limited to cases-- 
such as this one--where an attempt to correct a mistaken 
identification occurs prior to final adjudication of a claim. 
 
Once again, the Director's interpretation is not 
inconsistent with the regulation. Moreover, it is not 
inconsistent with due process. Due process is simply not 
implicated when--as here--an attempt to correct a 
misidentification is made prior to final adjudication of the 
claim.2 Cf. Caudill Const., 878 F.2d at 181 (district director 
authorized to correct misidentification of responsible carrier 
"even where a final compensation order has been issued 
against the operator"). While it might seem unfair to require 
a claimant who has already proven entitlement once to 
have to prove it again, relitigation of a finally-decided claim 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because a motion to remand was made prior tofinal adjudication of 
the merits in this case, we need not consider the Director's position that 
due process would not bar a district director's attempt to correct a 
mistaken responsible operator identification when that attempt is not 
made until after final adjudication. 
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is not unprecedented in the black lung program. The 
statutorily prescribed modification procedure, for example, 
allows a fact finder, upon any party's motion, to review 
previously-considered facts and find a "mistake in a 
determination of fact." 20 C.F.R. S 725.310. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has observed that 
 
       the "plain import of [the modification statute] was to 
       vest a [district director] with broad discretion to correct 
       mistakes of fact, whether demonstrated by wholly new 
       evidence, cumulative evidence, or merely further 
       reflection on the evidence initially submitted. 
 
O'Keeffe v. Aerojet-General Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254, 
256, 92 S. Ct. 405, 407 (1971) (per curiam). Thus, "the 
statute and regulations give the [district director] the 
authority, for one year after the final order on the claim, to 
simply rethink a prior finding of fact." Jessee v. Director, 
OWCP, 5 F.3d 723, 724-25 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 
In addition, Venicassa had no expectation of finality in 
the ALJ's 1989 award of benefits. See id. ("[T]he principle of 
finality" just does not apply to Longshore Act and black 
lung claims as it does in ordinary lawsuits."). The Director 
appealed that decision to the Board, arguing not only that 
the ALJ had erroneously denied the remand motion, but 
that he had erred in awarding benefits.3  Venicassa had no 
reason, therefore, to believe that the ALJ's award settled the 
issue of his entitlement to benefits. His entitlement 
remained at issue regardless of the identity of the liable 
party. We must defer to the Director's interpretation of this 
regulation. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. By filing a motion to remand, and then renewing it at the hearing, the 
Director did everything within his control to correct the mistaken 
responsible operator identification before the ALJ awarded benefits 
payable by the Trust Fund. The Director could not order the ALJ to 
grant the motion, see Director, OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding and 
Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 134, 115 S. Ct. 1278, 1287 (1995); Old Ben 
Coal Co. v. Luker, 826 F.2d 688, 696 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987), and an appeal 
to the Board at that point would have been interlocutory. 
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       3. Duty to Identify as Soon as Evidence Permits 
 
Finally, the Director asserts that it is inappropriate to 
mandate identification of a responsible operator within a 
reasonable time after the information necessary to make an 
identification becomes available to the district director. 
Such a reading, according to the Director, "essentially reads 
a time limitation into the regulation that `would inject a 
degree of uncertainty into future responsible operator 
identifications.' " Respondent's Br. at 30 (quoting Oglebay, 
877 F.2d at 1303). 
 
The Director's interpretation of this language is 
inconsistent with the regulation. While section 725.412(a) 
includes the phrase "at any time during the processing of 
the claim," it also includes the phrase "[s]uch identification 
shall be made as soon after the filing of the claim as the 
evidence obtained permits." Thus, the Director 
impermissibly reads the second phrase completely out of 
the regulation for all practical purposes. See Oglebay, 877 
F.2d at 1306-07 (Wellford, J., dissenting). Because meaning 
must be given to every word "so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant," Sekula, 39 
F.3d at 454-55 n.16, this aspect of the Director's 
interpretation is entitled to no deference. 
 
       4. Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that a district director 
is authorized to correct a mistaken responsible operator 
identification at any time prior to final adjudication of a 
claim. However, such corrections must be made within a 
reasonable time after the information necessary to make 
such a correction becomes available to him. Because the 
Director sought to correct the mistaken identification in 
this case approximately eighteen months before final 
adjudication of the claim, he acted within a reasonable 
time, and the ALJ should have granted his motion to 
remand. I would therefore affirm the Board's decision to 
vacate Venicassa's award so that the ALJ could designate 
the proper responsible operator. 
 
B. The Majority's Interpretation 
 
According to the majority, section 725.412(a) must be 
interpreted as follows: 
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        While the regulation clearly states that the 
       designation of the responsible operator may be made 
       "at any time," the language of the regulation triggers 
       the process by providing that the designation be made 
       "after sufficient evidence has been made available to 
       the deputy commissioner." The regulation then further 
       limits the process by providing that the designation 
       "shall be made as soon after the filing of the claim as 
       evidence obtained permits." 20 C.F.R. S 725.412(a). The 
       focus of the regulation is clearly on the swift and 
       accurate designation of the responsible operator so 
       that the claim may be resolved through the 
       presentation of evidence to the fact finder by the 
       appropriate parties. 
 
Maj. Op. at 12. 
 
While the majority properly concludes that section 
725.412(a) requires the designation of a responsible 
operator as soon as the evidence reasonably permits, see 
Oglebay, 877 F.2d at 1306-07 (Wellford, J., dissenting), it 
fails to provide any mechanism for the correction of a 
mistaken responsible operator identification, regardless of 
how quickly and reasonably the attempted correction is 
made. See Maj. Op. at 10 ("The ALJ's decision [to deny the 
Director's motion to remand] places the incentives in the 
proper place--the Director should have gotten it right the 
first time. That would not have been an onerous task, 
because, from the outset, the OWCP had in its possession 
all the information necessary to name the proper 
responsible operator.") (emphasis added). This view is 
incorrect for several reasons. 
 
First, the majority's interpretation is inconsistent with, 
and completely ignores, our obligation to defer to an 
agency's interpretation of its own regulations unless it is 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.4 Here, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The majority expressly disavows reaching its conclusion on due 
process grounds. See Maj. Op. at 12 n.6. It does not, however, offer any 
reason why the Director's interpretation is not owed"substantial 
deference." Indeed, rather than defer to the Director's interpretation of 
its own agency guidelines, the majority defers to the Benefit Review 
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the Director reads section 725.412 to permit the correction 
of mistaken responsible operator identifications. Because 
this view is not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation," see Caudill Const. Co., 878 F.2d at 181; 
Oglebay, 877 F.2d at 1305, it is entitled to substantial 
deference. 
 
Second, the majority's conclusion that a district director 
is never authorized to correct a mistaken responsible 
operator identification fails to give any effect whatsoever to 
section 725.412(c). Such a reading violates our duty "to give 
each word of the [regulation] operative effect[,]" Smith v. 
Magras, 124 F.3d 457, 462 (3d Cir. 1997), and renders this 
provision "inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant." 
Sekula, 39 F.3d at 454-55 n.16 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
Third, the majority view is at odds with clear 
congressional intent, expressed over a period of years, to 
limit Trust Fund liability to instances in which no 
responsible operator can be identified. See  26 U.S.C. 
S 9501(d). In creating the Trust Fund, Congress intended to 
"ensure that individual coal operators rather than the trust 
fund bear the liability for claims arising out of such 
operator's mines to the maximum extent feasible." S. Rep. 
No. 95-209, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977), reprinted in 
House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 96th Cong., Black Lung 
Benefits Reform Act and Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act 
of 1977, 612 (Comm. Print 1979); see also Old Ben Coal, 
826 F.2d at 693. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Board's interpretation of section 725.412 in Crabtree v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp., 7 BLR 1-354 (1984). See id. at 11 ("In other words, the Crabtree 
concerns about due process and piecemeal litigation . . . are greater in 
the instant case than were those faced by the court in Oglebay."). Such 
deference, however, is improper for two reasons. First, "we give judicial 
deference to the Director, as policymaker, rather than to the Board, 
which is purely an adjudicator." Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 54 F.3d at 
147 (citations omitted). Second, Crabtree was wrongly decided because it 
fails to provide for the correction of mistaken responsible operator 
identifications and improperly injects a requirement into the regulation 
that the responsible operator must be identified at a preliminary 
proceeding. Crabtree; 7 BLR at 1-357; see also Director, OWCP v. Trace 
Fork Coal Co., 67 F.3d 503, 508 (4th Cir. 1995) (requiring identification 
of a responsible operator at a preliminary proceeding). 
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Finally, the majority's interpretation also conflicts with 
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Oglebay, where at least two 
judges (and possibly a third5) concluded that section 
725.412(a) authorizes the correction of a mistaken 
responsible operator identification.6  It is also at odds with 
Caudill Construction, where the Sixth Circuit observed that 
subsection (c) "permits notification of a new operator where 
investigation reveals that prior identification was mistaken." 
878 F.2d at 181. Contrary to the majority's interpretation of 
the regulation, it is clear that section 725.412(a) and (c) 
both authorize the correction of mistaken responsible 
operator identifications. 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although Judge Wellford expressed concern in his Oglebay dissent 
with "giving the [district director] unfettered discretion to name a 
responsible operator at any time, virtually without limitation[,]" 877 
F.2d 
at 1306 (Wellford, J., dissenting), and with "encourag[ing] sloppy and 
unreasonable administration of the Act[,]" id. at 1307 (Wellford, J., 
dissenting), he did not consider whether section 725.412 authorized the 
correction of mistaken responsible operator identifications. It is 
interesting to note, however, that Judge Wellford joined the majority 
opinion in Caudill Construction, a case decided just seven days before 
Oglebay, which observed that section 725.412(c) "permits notification of 
a new operator where investigation reveals that prior identification was 
mistaken . . . ." 878 F.2d at 181. 
 
6. The majority correctly observes that Oglebay is somewhat 
distinguishable from the instant case because correction of the mistaken 
responsible operator identification was made prior to final adjudication 
of the claim. However, this distinction is immaterial because, as noted 
above, relitigation of a finally-decided claim is: (1) consistent with the 
regulation; (2) consistent with congressional intent; (3) not uncommon in 
the black lung program; and (4) does not violate due process. 
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